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State-steered smartmentality in Chinese smart urbanism 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the socio-political shaping of Chinese smart urbanism by examining 
the power relations between the government (national and municipal), private firms and 
citizens embedded in smartmentality. Our exploration begins with teasing out key 
analytical standpoints of Alberto Vanolo’s concept of smartmentality applied in 
neoliberal practices of smart urbanism. Through this analytical framework, we 
conceptualise Chinafied smartmentality and illustrate how it is actually playing out in 
China by undertaking documentary research and in-depth interviews from an inductive 
case study of the Smart Transportation System (STS) in the city of Shijiazhuang. We 
observe that the idea of Chinafication extends smartmentality with a focus on the power 
dynamic. We further argue that this Chinafied smartmentality implies uncritical 
technological solutionism that is state-steered in nature and citizen participation in digital 
platforms that is performed with limited roles and power of being included. The paper 
concludes by calling for future research on the critical examination of value co-creation 








The notion of ‘smart urbanism’ has gained traction amongst diverse social actors to refer 
to the socio-political and political economic dynamics of technology-enabled and 
networked urbanism (Kitchin, 2014; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2019) from which smart 
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cities emerge. This ‘smart urbanism’ label has engendered critical urban research on 
rethinking forms of city governance and new models of government in the smart city 
(Vanolo, 2014). The way in which smart cities are governed, i.e., what observers such as 
Giffinger et al. (2007) have labelled smart governance, evolves differently in diverse 
geographical contexts, including China, the focus of this study. However, smart 
governance is not merely leveraged by high technology but driven by a set of ‘mentalities 
of rules’, reflected as governmentality (Foucault, 1991 [1978]). Namely, there are 
political rationalities shaping the ways in which government programmes are constructed 
and socio-technical imperatives put these rationalities into effect (O’Malley et al., 1997).  
 
The governing of smart urbanism programmes is often strategised to be the restructuring 
of the urban regime and has been observed to involve various socio-technical practices, 
such as ‘governing through code’ (Klauser et al., 2014), visualisation of urban platforms 
(Young et al., 2020), and implementation of urban operating systems. Extending beyond 
these practices, Vanolo (2014) argues a brand-new urban epistemology is emerging – 
smartmentality. It acts as a discipline system in which new geometries of power are 
embedded for governing the smart urbanism. Based on his research in Italy, Vanolo 
observes that the contemporary smart urbanism involves bringing together social 
positionalities of diverse interest groups, knowledge and rationalities that co-produce and 
reshape governing strategies. This transformation entails new power relations between 
the state (government), private firms, and citizenry.  
 
However, understanding of smartmentality in smart urbanism varies in different 
geopolitical contexts. In China, for example, ten super cities with populations above 10 
million were predicted to exist by 2030 (Chan and Anderson, 2018). Such a rapid 
transition necessitates significant indigenous social and political commitments, which it 
has been argued can be achieved by a shift towards technology-mediated and citizen-
focused urban restructuring (Li and De Jong, 2017). This objective was incorporated into 
the ‘New-type Urbanization Plan (NUP)’ (State Council, 2014) released by the Chinese 
national government in March 2014. The NUP was explicitly defined as Chinese smart 
urbanism. However, despite many efforts to explore the design, running and perceived 
challenges of smart city initiatives under the NUP (Li and De Jong, 2017; Chan and 
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Anderson, 2018), little reflection has taken place on understanding the socio-political 
rationalities of Chinese smart urbanism through Vanolo’s (2014) lens of smartmentality. 
A deeper exploration of the geometries of power relations enacted by different actors in 
the creation of the Chinese smart urbanism is imperative.  
 
Of particular interest in the Chinese context is whether the emergence of smart urbanism 
potentially replicates urban transformation towards a form of neoliberalism as seen in 
other countries – for instance, beyond Vanolo’s work on the Italian context, South Africa 
promotes its ‘One Cape 2040’ vision in Cape Town, manifesting a stronger public-private 
partnership (Odendaal, 2015); Indian’s smart urbanism is aimed at constructing 
entrepreneurial cities (Datta, 2015, 2018); Singaporean politicians advocate the Smart 
Nation initiative that is built upon the ‘neoliberal-developmental logic’ (Ho, 2017). 
Likewise, Shin (2014) argues that Chinese urbanisation processes in general reflect the 
construction of capitalism. China has thus been considered by some to be somehow 
neoliberalised since the embedding of market reforms for opening-up the economy from 
1978, which it has been argued led to an underlying change of state-capital relations (He 
and Wu, 2009; Li and Chan, 2017). He and Wu's (2009) thesis is that China’s neoliberal 
urban transformation manifests a shift from high state expenditure towards a marketized 
society. Xing and Shaw (2013) claim this as ‘state capitalism’, so the market economy is 
established on the state interests, outstripping capital and class interests, forming a unique 
form of neoliberalism, echoing what Harvey (2007) reflects as ‘neoliberalism with 
Chinese characteristics’.  
 
This uniqueness can be discerned in current reports about replacing the ‘growth-at-all-
costs’ with a ‘politics-in-command’ economy, and of the endeavour to balance market 
prosperity and national security (Economist, 2021). For example, the state has devised 
Data Security Law and Anti-Monopoly Law (Zhang, 2021) to seek to redistribute the 
market power of domestic tech monopolies like Huawei and Alibaba. In extending smart 
urbanism, these practices mirror Li et al.'s (2016) observations that the state continues to 
apply an interventionist approach, meaning that despite the technological dominance 
enacted by the “titans” to develop smart city projects – e.g. 5G networks, autonomous 
vehicles, the City Brain, to name a few – the state itself seems to determine the future 
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orientation of urban development. In other words, China’s neoliberal smart urbanism 
takes place in a context where political intervention is strong, without much space for the 
autonomy of non-state actors and their activities.  
 
Nevertheless, little research has critically examined the continuation of Chinese state 
power in extending smart urbanism through the concept of smartmentality which offers 
a lens onto issues of governance of the smart city. This study bridges this gap by 
undertaking a case study of the development of a Smart Transportation System (STS) in 
Shijiazhuang, a Chinese demonstration smart city of Tier-2 status. Drawing upon work 
on neoliberal rationalities, this study aims to explore the socio-political shaping of 
Chinese smart urbanism by examining the power relations between the government 
(national and municipal), private firms and citizens embedded in smartmentality. 
Vanolo’s (2014) concept of smartmentality is used as a lens to analyse the case of 
Shijiazhuang. Our findings lead us to argue that Shijiazhuang’s smart urbanism is 
strategised to be Chinafied – i.e. neoliberal practices are replicated in their own way, 
developing towards being what we call ‘state-steered’.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured in five sections. The second section introduces the 
concept of smartmentality in both Chinese and non-Chinese city contexts. The third 
section focuses on the smartmentality analytical framing of the study based on the 
neoliberal practices researchers have observed in governing Chinese smart urbanism. The 
next section introduces our case study and methods. Followed are two sections that 
outline the findings of the research, shaping our key observations around state-steered 
technological solutionism and state-steered citizenship. The final section discusses our 
key arguments around the idea of Chinafied smartmentality. It also considers the future 
research orientations for work in this field.  
 
Smartmentality for contemporary smart urbanism 
Vanolo (2014) identifies the governmentality of the contemporary smart urbanism as a 
discipline mechanism that he defines as smartmentality. Many states and supra-national 
organisations endorse this form of smartmentality as the path to achieve technologically 
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advanced and sustainable urban transformation. In some cases the logic of smartmentality 
is charted into a set of urban benchmarking tools which allow cities to evaluate their smart 
initiatives by using data-driven ranking systems (Giffinger et al., 2007). Often times, the 
ranking criteria are created by the private sector and the standard is set in concert with 
tech giants aiming to enact their vision of a utopian landscape of the urban future 
(Townsend, 2013). Cities are increasingly moulded into business platforms like Amazon, 
i.e. platform urbanism (Graham et al., 2020; Caprotti and Liu, 2019). It is no coincidence 
that benchmarking practices within platform urbanism help to build a strong industrial 
coalition in which emerging socio-technical assemblages take shape. These practices 
meanwhile raise controversial debates about the necessity of political interventions, and 
to what extent they become useful to government and governance. Kitchin (2015) argues 
that the smart city concept is never apolitical and non-ideological as far as issues around 
civil rights, social inequality and inclusiveness are concerned. Further, platform-based 
infrastructural designs from which vested interests benefit might lead to splintering 
urbanism (Graham and Marvin, 2002), as data-driven benchmarking practices, in 
particular, would enhance digitally social stratification and marginalisation.  
 
Smartmentality in urban China, however, demonstrates a quite different rationality. In 
this context, instead of being co-opted by tech giants, data-driven benchmarking practices 
in Chinese smart urbanism are standardised by the state apparatus (Lin, 2018). Over the 
last decade, a huge amount of investment has been made by the state into big data 
solutions – which are harnessed to government efforts at social regulation and 
coordination – as discipline mechanisms to manage what the state deems to be urban and 
social pathologies. However, whilst people enjoy using technology, they are meanwhile 
strait-jacketed by the algorithms and analytics embedded within. Amongst various big 
data practices, quite a few are designated as smart because they are future-oriented, 
thereby enabling a speculative practice of algorithmic smartmentality (Leszczynski, 
2016). For urban China, this speculative nature is manifested as ‘state surveillance’, such 
as the social credit system as a vehicle for enforcing regulations and enhancing social 
solidarity (Liang et al., 2018; Engelmann et al., 2021). Although critical challenges at the 
municipal levels – such as low data quality and siloed databases (Ahmed, 2018) and the 
diversity, flexibility and comprehensiveness of social credits (Engelmann et al., 2021) – 
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are yet to be addressed, the initiation of the social credit system indicates government’s 
will to govern cities through big data. However, this practice alike may spark off issues 
relating to cities’ underlying proclivity to technologically solutionist approaches – i.e. 
seeing technology as panacea to urban issues (Morozov, 2013) – on the one hand, and 
uninterrupted citizenship – i.e. the ways in which citizens are engaged in producing smart 
urbanism and technologically locked-in to platform urbanism (Hemment and Townsend, 
2013; Kitchin, 2014) – on the other.  
 
With regard to the former, technological solutionism has been critiqued for lacking 
critical consideration of the social impact of urban technologies manipulated by vested 
interests such as the private sector and the state. These critics contend that technological 
regimes ought to supplement people, knowledge and politics, rather than the other way 
round (Söderström et al., 2014). As for uninterrupted citizenship, in the global reach of 
platforms, citizens are parsed by real-time data analytics and thus considered as coded 
subjects (Kitchin and Dodge, 2014). Although platform urbanism enables customisation, 
there is a lack of civic ability for self-governance (Mann et al., 2020). In China, for 
instance, the state has promoted open urban data (Liu et al., 2015) for citizens to better 
access government services. Instead of stressing that government data is crucial to 
citizens, however, the state is more interested in capturing personal data derived from 
state surveillance for effective governance and urban sovereignty (Liang et al., 2018). 
Whilst citizens in China are empowered to somehow consume services provided by 
platform vendors, the state, from time to time, intervenes in data collection and the way 
in which data are used towards political and economic ends. This may undermine the 
state-citizen relationship (Zhang and Chen, 2015) 
 
Both issues (technological solutionism and uninterrupted citizenship) reflect the 
underlying power dynamics in enabling a technology equipped urbanism and citizenry. 
Although populations in society are freed from physical and geographical restrictions and 
highly centralised control systems (Foucault et al., 2008 [1978]), they are, in the 
contemporary urban China, technically involved in digitally networked control systems. 
Deleuze (1992) refers to this as the ‘society of control’. The more smart technologies are 
leveraged, the more likely people can be surveilled, sampled and evaluated by the data 
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they generate. Whilst power in a neoliberal society of control is dispersed across various 
vested interests who use data to make significant decisions, it is in China limited to the 
state who constantly intervene in the market and the civil society in order to orchestrate 
the distributed social control mechanisms. But questions remain in how, by state 
intervention, private firms and citizens are involved in extending smart urbanism. In light 
of this understanding of the power structure that this article focuses on, we outline in the 
next section how the neoliberal practices common to understandings of smartmentality 
might be understood in the context of Chinese smart urbanism. 
 
 
Chinese smartmentality and neoliberal practices 
 
 “Smartness” as a concept has been argued to be a means of conveying neoliberal 
ideologies that serve the interests of corporations and emphasise less (or lean) government 
and more governance (Peck, 2013; Grossi and Pianezzi, 2017). Smartmentality is 
inevitably grounded in the neoliberal logic of governmentality. According to Vanolo 
(2014), the latter denotes a collective way of thinking of the state-society relationship, 
which suggests – instead of governance over people – people governing themselves, i.e. 
what Foucault referred to as ‘conducting the conduct’ of people at a distance (Foucault, 
1991 [1978]). However, this relationship is rather complex and needs to be researched in 
context. For example, in the UK, although the state behind the scene enforces legitimacy 
over some activities, over recent decades there has been growing advocacy for 
deregulation, market autonomy and privatisation on the basis of the restructuring of the 
welfare state (Thomas, 2016). In other words, neoliberal governmentality underlines the 
so-called ‘retreat of the state’ (Lemke, 2015) that re-delineates the power relations in 
society, where operations of government are transferred to non-state actors.  
 
Likewise, many Asian states also embrace neoliberalism as a strategy to revamp urban 
configurations, socio-material practices and spatial-temporal regimes of the urban. For 
instance, Ho (2017) argues that neoliberal governmentalities applied in Singapore are 
aimed at consolidating authoritarian power through privatising infrastructural design. 
Situating a neoliberalism-as-development strategy into the urban dynamism, Singapore 
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proposed a market-oriented Smart Nation initiative that reconfigures market and 
institutional forces ‘in service to the state’ (Ho, 2017). In India, in her work on India’s 
100 smart cities programme, Datta elucidates the extent to which Indian governmentality 
is entrenched in ‘home-grown neoliberalism’ embedded in strong private sector 
participation (Datta, 2015, 2018). She observes that in pursuing the entrepreneurial state, 
unproductive public land resources have been appropriated and thus transformed into 
business that is run by entrepreneurs meanwhile in some way being state led. In China, 
however, two building blocks make the use of the neoliberal smartmentality framework 
slightly different than in these other Asian countries.  
 
The first building block is the nature and structure of dynamics of power transfer from 
the state to non-state sectors, from the central authorities to local agents, and from 
organisations to individuals. In their study of China's emerging neoliberal urbanism: 
Perspectives from urban redevelopment, He and Wu (2009) argue that geopolitical forces 
may come with convergent practices of neoliberal urbanism in different localities, and 
sub-national regimes can most effectively enforce neoliberal experiments and manage 
their territories. Contrary to Jessop's (2013) notion of neoliberalism being a hollowing 
out of the state, this suggests meaningful decentralisation of state resources and 
recalibrated functions of municipalities for local and regional innovation and economic 
competitiveness on the basis of the ‘politics of scale’ (Li and Chan, 2017). Whilst cities 
in China are usually the place where neoliberal practices are enacted, political-economic 
contingencies vary across municipalities. This is to say, rather than simply examining 
smart urbanism at the state level, it is more crucial to unbox municipal socio-political 
dynamics that impact on the shaping of power relations.  
 
The second building block is technocracy and tokenistic democracy within the urban 
political economy. Since neoliberal practices worldwide often act as the guardian of 
technocratic and corporate forms of governance (Hollands, 2015; Kitchin, 2015), they are 
critiqued as undermining democratic accountability. Concerning the smart city in western 
democracies, this raises concerns for whom the city is created, like studies promoting a 
‘manifesto’ of smart citizenship (Hill, 2013). Critical urban scholars argue for ordinary 
citizens owning the city (De Lange and De Waal, 2017), decentralised and open smart 
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city infrastructural designs (Hemment and Townsend, 2013), and smart citizens 
remaining active in civic tech and hackathons (Perng et al., 2018) alike. Symbolically, 
such manifestoes sound to be a remarkable transformation in the existing neoliberal 
governmentality as they accentuate a certain extent of autonomy. However, in most actual 
smart cities citizens are still treated as consumers being nudged towards specific conducts 
and behaviours, suggesting practices of stewardship and civic paternalism (i.e. the state 
makes decisions on what to offer their citizens) (Cardullo and Kitchin, 2019). To some 
extent, such a consumerism evaporates an accountable democratic process. This is also 
the case in China; however, a key distinction is how market and individual freedom are 
defined. Zhang (2008) argues that in China there is also some emancipation of the 
economy and citizenship; however, it is deeply circumscribed into the state’s regulatory 
frameworks and legal systems. In a nutshell, Chinese neoliberal governmentalities do not 
contradict government regulations and national top-level design and strategic planning 
even if they are market- or citizen-oriented. The state plays a monopolistic role in 
delimiting the scale and scope of market and individual freedom. Whilst such a political-
driven governmentality is often construed as a contradiction in itself, designated as 
‘authoritarian capitalism’ (Witt and Redding, 2014), ‘state neoliberalism’ (So and Chu, 
2012) or ‘market socialism’ (Zheng and Scase, 2013), it is nevertheless rather complex, 
complicated and heterogeneous, making it difficult to unearth specific power relations 
amongst entities.  
 
Drawing on the above building blocks, in this paper we report the findings of an empirical 
study on smart transportation system (STS) development in the Chinese city of 
Shijiazhuang. The paper reports on a sub-section of the study findings, to focus on an 
examination of the power relations between the national and municipal state, private firms 
and local citizens through the lens of smartmentality. 
 
Case study: Smart transportation systems in Shijiazhuang 
Shijiazhuang is the capital municipality of Hebei Province, and one of the primary 
transport network hubs in China with rich transportation resources. Not only is 
Shijiazhuang sophisticated in inter-urban communications, but it is also advanced in 
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intra-urban transportation services. Existing political economic conditions make 
Shijiazhuang an exemplar, and a leading city, of STS development in extending the new 
urbanism amongst Chinese cities at the same administrative level. Given its transportation 
advantage, Shijiazhuang is paid special attention by the national government as a Smart 
City demonstration project that reflects and characterises geopolitical dynamics of the 
new urbanism.  
 
More specifically, over the past five years influential STS initiatives in Shijiazhuang have 
emerged in response to the NUP. Nevertheless, one of the obstacles has been the lack of 
integration of heterogenous data sources and the extraction of embedded data value 
(ChinaIRR, 2018), resulting in data islands and fragmented regulation and administration. 
Shijiazhuang municipality has made grandiose plans to become the national spearhead 
for developing data-integrated transportation systems and a ‘one-stop platform’ of urban 
transportation. Over the coming decade, this would mean replicating such a ‘Hebei 
Standard’ to elsewhere in China; hence, the Shijiazhuang municipal government set out 
to promote coproduction of STS services with other municipalities (Hebnews, 2021).  
Substantial efforts have been made to promote private sector investment through offering 
special funds for inward investments, providing entrepreneurial opportunities for local 
STS start-ups, and building high-tech industrial development zones to stimulate economic 
competitiveness (Zhao, 2011). Specifically, new transportation infrastructures are being 
developed to embed high capacity for processing a large amount of data sources through 
the integration of 5G networks, Internet of Things, and BeiDou Navigation Satellite 
System (Hebnews, 2021). This study offers empirical insights on the socio-political 
shaping of these developments in Shijiazhuang in which power relations between 
different stakeholders (national and municipal state, private sector and citizens) reflect a 
Chinafied form of smartmentality.  
 
We carried out a review of NUP and Chinese smart city policies alongside 20 semi-
structured interviews as empirical data. Amongst them, 15 participants from three local 
STS firms in Shijiazhuang were interviewed, including three project managers who had 
gained strong experience in managing and supervising STS projects on a macro scale and 
were knowledgeable in both technical and social aspects of developing STS applications, 
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especially those in relation to their own organisational context; three strategic directors 
who were specialised in top-level design and overall planning of STS project 
implementation and usually had strong connections with government officials and policy-
makers; and nine data scientists. Another five interviews were undertaken to consult 
municipal government officials in different positions from Shijiazhuang Transportation 
Bureau (STB hereafter) and Shijiazhuang Traffic Management Bureau in Department of 
Public Security of Hebei Province (STMB hereafter). The arguments made in the 
following sections are built upon the narrative from the synthesis of policies, literature 
and excerpts from our empirical study.  
 
State-steered technological solutionism  
This findings section discusses the Shijiazhuang case of the power relation between the 
national government, municipal government and private firms in the new urbanism; the 
first building block of Chinese smartmentality identified above is reflected by our 
observations of the Shijiazhuang municipal government adopting a technologically 
solutionist vision for local STS developments. This vision emphasises the favouring of 
technocratic decision making, leading to Shijiazhuang municipal government positioning 
itself as a smart government in an effort to engage local private firms in extending the 
smart urbanism. In the following paragraphs, we develop two anchor points from the 
findings to demonstrate the form of technological solutionism playing out in 
Shijiazhuang’s STS developments. 
 
Firstly, we observe that despite various marketised and privatised STS solutions in 
Shijiazhuang, Chinafied neoliberal smartmentality reveals a top-down power structure of 
the state and its subordinate institutions, for instance, in the extent to which municipal 
governments have autonomy in administration. While the NUP claims to deliver more 
autonomy from national government to municipalities and private sector, evidence from 
Shijiazhuang suggests that the NUP does not fully achieve this. This is due to the lack of 
effective political devolution, i.e. a lack of empowering subordinate levels of government. 
As one participant observed: 
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“We know what we need [to do] – deploying reversible lanes on the main road, 
for example – but we are not fully empowered to make critical decisions of doing 
so. Our execution of duty must correspond to the legitimacy of decision-making 
from the top [government]. We do what we have been informed to do within the 
jurisdictional remit.” (Interview: Government agency, STMB) 
 
Shijiazhuang municipal government has insufficient resources distributed from the 
national government and limited power to put decision-making into effect. As a 
consequence, transportation departments like STB and STMB have no alternative but to 
conform to what they are mandated to do, even if it is very likely that they are more 
familiar with local issues in practice.  
 
There have been a few times over the past several decades where the Chinese state has 
advocated for a more transparent, dynamic, and decentralised form of governance since 
the Reform and Opening-Up in 1978. However, the findings of our research in 
Shijiazhuang suggest that the idea of ‘decentralisation’ expressed in the NUP is 
superficial. Despite market-oriented smart city delivery and provisioning, examination of 
the NUP’s proposed political devolution in practice raises critical concerns regarding the 
extent to which authorities subordinate to the national government are empowered with 
the right of decision making.  
 
He and Wu (2009) argue that two tasks are crucial to urban redevelopment projects – 
creating incentives at the local level and transferring responsibility from the centre to the 
local. Extending from this, we observed in our study that the municipal government was 
mandated to implement smart urbanism agendas enacted by the national government. The 
implementation of particular technologies has been considered imperative, in a 
technically solutionist way, by the national state. The national government works on top-
level design and decision making, whereas the municipal level is more active in operation 
and implementation with symbolic compliance. However, Shijiazhuang’s local and 
district variations of social, political, cultural and technical dynamics were often 
neglected. Whilst local intricacies may vary from place to place, the municipal 
government of Shijiazhuang is observed to follow along with the national agenda 
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regardless. This pattern of power relations between the national and municipal 
government contributes to shaping the technological solutionism evident in the city’s 
smart urbanism.  
 
Secondly, we observe that the NUP as implemented in Shijiazhuang’s STS developments 
demonstrates a pro-government mode of smart urbanism enabled by industry alliances 
and state-private partnerships. In the case of Shijiazhuang’s STS, whilst the municipal 
government owns comprehensive transportation data sources (e.g. road networks, 
infrastructure data), in order to advance the STS initiative they need complementary data 
that are heterogenous and citizen-oriented in nature from private firms. These data from 
private firms are considered rich and timely and are perceived to contain value that can 
be harnessed by government for effective urban control and governance. For example, 
vehicle density data owned by car-sharing firms would be of value for managing traffic 
flows. Under national regulations, municipal governments have legal rights to access 
private firms’ data; for instance, GPS data concerning real-time bike distribution from 
bike-sharing firms. This legal right to access is referred to as ‘data handover’ by those 
working in government.  
 
Behind this right of ‘data handover’ indicates a future possibility for Shijiazhuang’s STS 
development. First, more centralised traffic control, mass surveillance, and coordination 
could be strengthened if the municipal government back up all data sources in one place. 
Second, they could more effectively exert regulatory oversight through comprehensive 
data analysis over market activities and information dissemination. Participants noted that 
Shijiazhuang municipal government was making an effort to establish ‘coordination 
mechanisms’ for the purpose of managing STS stakeholder relations with value 
cocreation goals concerning data, application and service integration, reciprocal 
accountability and reliability, resource management, and leadership. These potentialities 
align with government visions for an integrated social credit system (Liang et al., 2018). 
The coordination mechanism comprised private actors, scholars and government officials.  
 
Extending from Vanolo’s (2014) discipline mechanisms of smartmentality that empowers 
private actors through partnerships and alliances, we observe initiatives like the emergent 
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coordination mechanisms in Shijiazhuang’s NUP transition were steered by the municipal 
government. For example, on the 11th October 2019, the Second China International 
Digital Economy Expo was held in Shijiazhuang (Xinhua, 2019). One of the sessions the 
expo participants noted as fascinating was the Shijiazhuang Smart City Summit Forum 
that convened renowned entrepreneurs from tech giants such as Alibaba and Huawei, 
academic scholars from Beihang University, political elites from the State Information 
Centre, and technocrats from the Central Government. The Shijiazhuang New-Type 
Smart City Master Planning (SNSC) agenda was officially released as a response to the 
NUP. The SNSC highlighted 46 major projects, including a cloud-based and networked 
smart transportation service platform. One year before these projects were launched, the 
Shijiazhuang Municipal Government constituted Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) to 
undertake the preliminary work underlying these projects. An SPV is a policy mechanism 
officially administered by the municipal government and aggregates some of government 
assets such as traffic data to undertake special tasks that involved protocol-based data 
input and output and data transactions between the public and private sector. Shijiazhuang 
Big Data Centre was considered by participants a representative SPV, jointly founded by 
the municipal government and state enterprises, with the aim to effectively manage and 
coordinate diverse data resources for distinct purposes (Hebei News, 2020). In short, the 
aim of building SPVs was to unify data resources and integrate independent systems.  
 
The building of SPVs with an ultimate goal of integrating data requires the municipal 
government to mobilise heterogeneous data sources based on national government’s 
master planning and system integration, but participants report that various challenges 
exist. Firstly, geo-political contingencies vary between cities at different administrative 
scales. Because of uneven distribution of transportation resources, innovations that are 
well developed in cities on a different administrative level may not be adaptable to 
Shijiazhuang, and vice versa.  Secondly, a national standard system has not yet been 
established. Despite many efforts to build data infrastructures for effective integration, a 
plethora of big data in Chinese smart cities still remain in silos (An et al., 2016; Li et al., 
2019). Our research in Shijiazhuang indicated that failures to create a national standard 
is not because of technology only, but due to the symbiotic relationship between 
government and vested interests. Government and public and private firms reciprocally 
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benefit from the interests of each other, namely win-win ends that reflect the prioritisation 
of state interests in fostering an economic competitiveness that rests on innovations 
developed by these firms. For example, many Chinese smart city initiatives, such as built 
data infrastructures (Ming and Wang, 2013), open government data practices (Liu et al., 
2015; Gao, 2016), and big data-led sharing economy (An, 2015), are steered by the state 
whilst technically underpinned by technology firms. Standardising smart city resources 
was therefore considered by participants to threaten competing vested interests on a larger 
scale. The national government would not embark on this without deliberation on the 
profound impact such a move may have on overall urban innovation capacity and market 
dynamics from which citizens can benefit. These observations demonstrate some of the 
power relations playing out between the municipal state and private firms which in 
concert co-shape technologically solutionist interventions. Yet, despite the echoes with 
neoliberal market-orientation, the state steers the coordination and partnerships.   
 
To sum up, reflecting He and Wu's (2009) observations of the neoliberal characteristics 
of Chinese contemporary urbanism, we observed that Shijiazhuang’s technological 
solutionism appeared to be constrained by unique Chinese political and legal systems. 
This is to say, despite adaptations and replications of technical solutions from other 
countries, we contend that the technologically solutionist form of smartmentality that we 
observed in Shijiazhuang was national government, rather than private sector, steered in 
nature. For the purpose of (re-)distributing and coordinating resources, the national state 
was observed to orientate the coalition between the national and municipal state and 
private sectors towards national state interests. In so doing, it enacted a smart discipline 
mechanism for standardising smart city practices. Under such a state-steered mechanism, 
citywide industry alliances and state-private partnerships based on the NUP, we observed, 
suggest a form of smartmentality that is Chinafied.  
 
State-steered citizen participation through digital platforms 
The second section of findings – reflecting the second building block established in 
literature – analyses Shijiazhuang’s case in relation to technocracy and tokenistic forms 
of democratic citizenship. Shijiazhuang’s STS development not only has implications for 
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state-private power relations, but also transforms the means by which services are 
delivered for civic ends. While the neoliberal rationality of the NUP claims to be ‘citizen-
centric’ and foster democratic accountability, in the context of Shijiazhuang many 
participants alluded to ‘state manipulation’ (Interview: STS firms). The proliferation of 
platform-based STS initiatives in Shijiazhuang reshapes civic mobility patterns and the 
mode of citizen participation in creating smarter urban transportation. On the one hand, 
citizens become ‘smarter’ (as in more informed) in their daily interaction with digital 
arrangements; on the other, smart urbanism on a broader level is being extended by the 
growth of this platform urbanism.  
 
However, we note that Chinese platform urbanism overemphasises commodification and 
political legitimacy with respect to national strategy, and often leaves citizens’ will aside. 
For example, an echo prevails amongst scholars that platform urbanism is crucial in 
building urban ecosystems and governing Chinese cities (Caprotti and Liu, 2019; Chen 
and Qiu, 2019). Our findings in Shijiazhuang echo neoliberal practices in many western 
countries that this platformisation is largely led by private firms, who are perceived as 
“more qualified and trustworthy by the state” than government departments (Interview: 
government, STB). The municipal government fully encourages citizens’ digital 
participation by giving way to private firms for civic innovations, e.g. Shijiazhuang Smart 
Public Transport App. However, the way in which innovations are developed is 
manoeuvred by the government. An underlying issue of building platform urbanism 
herein would need to be reflected upon: is the wide civic public satisfied with those 
designated ‘citizen-centric’ solutions? Certainly, this is not merely a problem with 
analytics, algorithms, and automation, etc, but about deeply entrenched civic issues with 
respect to, what we note, two interrelated factors: ownership of platform urbanism and 
civic control.  
 
Our empirical research responded to the longstanding debate in smart city discourse in 
regard to who are included in the digital society within the new urbanism. First of all, 
inclusiveness indicates the use of ‘hukou’ system (i.e. local household registration). Over 
a long time, people without the ‘urban hukou’ have been excluded from urban citizenship 
(Zhang, 2012), meaning that they were not qualified for many public services. In the case 
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of Shijiazhuang’s public transportation becoming ‘smart’, participants involved in the 
development noted that everyone would be able to use digital platforms, and that all state 
administrative procedures would be open to citizens via internet without ‘hukou’ 
constraints, such as applying for driving licences, assessing legal counselling, accessing 
policy change, etc. From this point of view, the emerging platform urbanism functions to 
redefine citizenship for those “actually existing smart citizens” (Shelton and Lodato, 
2019), so that the everyday mobility of everybody is platform-mediated. However, these 
smart initiatives indicate utopian ownership of platform urbanism. Quite the opposite is 
the issue of digital inclusion; not all citizens are digitally included, such as those 
marginalised as urban poor whose voice represents basic social demand.  
 
The Shijiazhuang municipal government follows the NUP to embrace the sustainability 
vision – whether or not it is a good solution with long-term effects – and, therefore, takes 
a majority principle into account (variegated in circumstances). The intention of this 
principle is not really to decide whether or not to include the marginalised, but to make 
apparently rational decisions in building sustainable living environments and in pursuing 
long-term interests of the vast majority.  
 
“Citizens are the end-users … Although their voice is important and smart 
technologies are pushed to better serve their life, we have to be critical in hearing 
what they say. Not all citizen demands are realistic; they are only a sort of 
expression for the ideal form of urban life. … Transport decision-makers would 
need to be critical in grasping critical success factors and have foresight of 
sustainable development” (Interview: STS firms) 
 
When it comes to specific actions and modalities of citizen participation in the 
implementation of Shijiazhuang’s STS, we observe that citizens are active in 
implementation and post-event feedback loops. That is, their input is more as a consumer 
of STS products. However, citizens have no role in the decision-making and design of 
STS systems, e.g. in terms of the types of service delivery, deployment of transportation 
facilities, and trajectories of data transmission. Instead, the municipal government 
following the strategy of the national government assumes to know what a “citizen-
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centric” design as mandated by the NUP should look like. Technocratic and commodified 
form of governance mediated by platforms has, we argue, led to a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
view of citizenship, namely the state’s (both national and municipal) decision making has 
always been true in terms of what is good for citizens.  
 
Limited citizen roles in turn are an advantage for the state to exert civic control through 
surveillance systems because citizens do little to change anything in relation to data and 
their mobility patterns. Thus, citizens fear to be unique, i.e. being what Pierce (2017) calls 
‘otherised’. Surveillance centralises the state power and strengthens its political 
legitimacy in defining the hierarchical power relation between the surveilled and 
surveillers. For example, in the context of Shijiazhuang’s STS, STMB provides a 
Hawkeye-enabled panoptic surveillance system displayed in the traffic control room. It 
targets not only criminals but also citizens who break traffic rules, or those who exploit 
the traffic legal loophole (e.g. speeding on roads without clearly stipulated speed limits). 
In a nutshell, surveillance-based digital platforms are, though innovated by corporations, 
harnessed by the state to exert civic control for strengthening technological sovereignty. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This study examined the power dynamic embedded in the Chinese new urbanism – based 
on an analysis of Shijiazhuang’s STS development – through the lens of Vanolo’s (2014) 
smartmentality. We argue that this smartmentality in this study is a manifestation of 
Chinafication. The term Chinafication rejects a one-size-fits-all form of neoliberal 
practices because of indigenous intricacies of its urban political economy which shapes 
‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’ (Harvey, 2007) that, in the case of this study, 
go much deeper in terms of power. The findings from Shijiazhuang indicate a more 
complex relationality of, and a multi-level perspective on, the power relations between 
stakeholders. Particularly, we argue that the state (both municipal and national) plays a 
steering role in the development of a smart urbanism that sits comfortably within 
Chinafied neoliberal practices common in many urban areas.  
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Firstly, on whether at national or municipal level the state steers the governance of the 
smart urbanism. More specifically, the national government steers the top-level design of 
the landscape, and both national and municipal governments steer the management and 
implementation processes. The municipal government, in particular, enacts a follow-up 
agenda in consolidating the national regime. This reflects an important aspect of 
Chinafied smartmentality, which is different from the Indian smart urbanism where the 
national, state and municipal governments focus on management, deployment and 
implementation, respectively (Ahluwalia, 2019; Prasad et al., 2021). The lack of political 
devolution in decision-making handicaps flexibility of pragmatic and substantial 
decision-making on the city’s STS efforts and often results in the overlooking of local 
contingencies and uncertainties, hence leading to low applicability and uptake rate of 
existing STS applications in the city.  
 
Secondly, the leading position of municipal governments vis-à-vis local private firms 
creates a state-based vantage point for effective urban governance that is technology 
enabled. While neoliberalism advocates free markets, privatisation and profitable capital 
accumulation (Harvey, 2007), in China municipal governments, rather than privatising 
public services, are keen to build coordination mechanisms to mobilise different agents 
across the private and public sectors. The building of SPVs is an effective state-steered 
mechanism to formulate policies, make rules and regulations, and integrate urban 
resources into one place. Distinct from the regulatory role of the state in the contemporary 
smart city in the neoliberal west, the Chinese state at both municipal and national levels 
centralises its power in a more delicate manner – one that constantly exercises market 
intervention via regulatory oversight and setting rules and tactics for tasks required to 
proceed. The fact that the state suspended the initial public offering (IPO) of Alibaba’s 
Ant Group, for instance, is a manifestation of the state leveraging regulatory and political 
influence on tech giants in terms of data ownership, inasmuch as troves of data generated 
from therein are considered crucial for governance (Economist, 2021). In the context of 
Shijiazhuang’s STS, state intervention is observed in the fact that the municipal 
government has a legal right to access firms’ databases. This is a practice that, on the one 
hand, demonstrates how these partnership arrangements can be win-win for both firms 
and government; the firm gets the contract and the government get the data. On the other 
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hand, data-driven technologies help to extend further smart innovations. Whilst the NUP 
extols the virtue of technology, it is moulded as a technologically solutionist vision by 
the national and municipal government.  
 
This leads to our third observation. Our empirical study of Shijiazhuang’s STS initiative 
reveals contradictions between STS deployment and citizenship. The emerging platform 
urbanism in Chinese cities also suggests a crucial aspect of Chinafied smartmentality. It 
transforms governance from ‘subjectification’ (restricting individual or group actions) 
(Krivý, 2018) towards Deleuze's (1992) ‘society of control’ . In the case of this study, 
this control is enabled by deterministic technologies which the state believes crucial for 
regulation of social order. Despite a certain extent of distributed power and citizen 
participation in the design of platform urbanism, the state determines how the algorithms 
and urban informatics behind the scenes serve the purpose of inclusion/exclusion, rather 
than these being citizen-deterministic, manifesting technocracy and tokenistic democracy. 
 
In urban China, we argue that all citizens are included in the smart city only when they 
are being watched through surveillance systems; this is the moment where the state aims 
to exert political control for building rigid social order and mitigating social unrest. 
However, beyond the purpose of surveillance, citizens have no opportunity to be included, 
especially in the design and decision-making process where they play little role. Within 
the neoliberal city context, histories of tokenistic and consumerist modes of citizen 
participation (Cardullo and Kitchin, 2019) have led to calls for the right to the smart city 
(Kitchin et al., 2019), technological sovereignty against anxieties of control (Mann et al., 
2020), and inclusive smart urbanism (Swilling, 2014; Lee et al., 2020). However, in China, 
local citizen inclusion in the design of smart cities is not often charted into the agenda; 
citizens are only engaged as end-user consumers giving feedback on smart applications. 
Moreover, the non-included does not necessarily refer only to the marginalised groups 
but those whose desires and proposed will of participation are not deemed realistic to the 
state. Decisions of whether they are realistic are made through negotiations between key 
state and corporate players, such as those involved in the coordination mechanisms. 
Citizen or community representatives never appear at such events. It just seems to be two 
bodies sitting together proposing a citizen-centric landscape of the new urbanism, without 
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really acknowledging what kind of solutions would deliver best value for their citizens – 
despite claiming they otherwise do. 
 
Rather than intending herein to critique any element of the ‘steering’ notion, we instead 
call for further polemics against the extent to which such state-steered rationalities would 
avoid Chinese new urbanism being uncritically technologically solutionist. This would 
also engender critical examination of value co-creation for shaping a truly citizen-centric 
mode of governance. Power relations between the government at different levels, firms 
and citizens have been unravelled in this article; however, the focus on Chinafied 
smartmentality of the new urbanism shows the importance of deeper exploration of 
effective value co-creation strategies in this context.  
 
Reference 
Ahluwalia IJ (2019) Urban governance in India. Journal of Urban Affairs 41(1): 83–102. 
 
Ahmed S et al. (2018) AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, 
Global, and Creative Perspectives. NSI Boston United States.  
 
An X (2015) Big Data and National Governance-Challenges to Government Information 
Governance Capability and the Transformation of Government. People’s Tribune 2: 36–
48. 
 
An X et al. (2016) Data integration in the development of smart cities in China: Towards 
a digital continuity model. In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Cyber 
Warfare and Security, Boston University, Boston, pp. 13–20. 
 
Caprotti F and Liu D (2019) Emerging platform urbanism in China: Reconfigurations of 
data, citizenship and materialities. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 151: 
119690. 
 
Cardullo P and Kitchin R (2019) Being a ‘citizen’in the smart city: up and down the 
 22 
scaffold of smart citizen participation in Dublin, Ireland. GeoJournal 84(1): 1–13. 
 
Chan JKS and Anderson S (2018) Rethinking Smart Cities-ICT for New-type 
Urbanization and Public Participation at the City and Community Level in China. United 
Nations Development Programme China: Beijing, China. 
 
Chen JY and Qiu JL (2019) Digital utility: Datafication, regulation, labor, and DiDi’s 
platformization of urban transport in China. Chinese Journal of Communication 12(3): 
274–289. 
 
ChinaIRR (2018) 2018-2024年河北省智慧交通行业发展分析及前景策略研究报告 A 
Report of Hebei Smart Transportation Industrial Development and Strategy Analgsis 
2018-2024. 
 
Datta A (2015) The smart entrepreneurial city. In: Marvin S, et al. (eds) Smart urbanism: 
Utopian vision or false dawn. London: Routledge, pp. 52. 
 
Datta A (2018) The digital turn in postcolonial urbanism: Smart citizenship in the making 
of India’s 100 smart cities. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 43(3): 
405–419. 
 
Deleuze G (1992) Postscript on the Societies of Control. In: Szeman I and Kaposy T (eds) 
Cultural Theory: An Anthology, pp.139-142 . 
 
Economist (2021) What tech does China want? 14 August. Available at: 
https://www.economist.com/business/what-tech-does-china-want/21803410 
 
Engelmann S, et al. (2021) Blacklists and Redlists in the Chinese Social Credit System: 
Diversity, Flexibility, and Comprehensiveness. In Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM 




Foucault M (1991[1978]) The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality: with two 
lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault. University of Chicago Press.  
 
Foucault M, Davidson AI and Burchell G (2008[1978]) The birth of biopolitics: lectures 
at the Collège de France, 1978-1979. Springer. 
 
Gao F (2016) Open government data in china: lesson learnt and new approaches. In: 
Proceedings of the 17th International Digital Government Research Conference on 
Digital Government Research. ACM, pp. 501–502. 
 
Giffinger R et al. (2007) City-ranking of European medium-sized cities. Cent. Reg. Sci. 
Vienna UT: 1–12. 
 
Graham M et al. (2019) How to run a city like Amazon, and other fables. London: 
Meatspace Press. 
 
Graham S and Marvin S (2002) Splintering urbanism: networked infrastructures, 
technological mobilities and the urban condition. London: Routledge. 
 
Grossi G and Pianezzi D (2017) Smart cities: Utopia or neoliberal ideology? Cities 69: 
79–85. 
 
Harvey D (2007) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. 
 
He S and Wu F (2009) China’s emerging neoliberal urbanism: Perspectives from urban 
redevelopment. Antipode 41(2): 282–304. 
 
Hebnews (2021) Department of Hebei Transportation Releases Three-Year Plan of 
Constructing the New-Type Transportation Infrastructure. Available at 
http://jt.hebnews.cn/2021-03/30/content_8441172.htm 
 
Hebnews (2020) Hebei Shijiazhuang: accelerating and upgrading big data application. 
 24 
Cyberspace Administration of China. Available at: http://www.cac.gov.cn/2020-
04/11/c_1588149704563889.htm 
 
Hemment D and Townsend A (2013) Smart citizens. Manchester. Available at: 
https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/20381872/smartcitizens1.pdf  
 
Hill D (2013) On the smart city: Or, a ‘manifesto’for smart citizens instead. City of Sound 
1. 
 
Ho E (2017) Smart subjects for a Smart Nation? Governing (smart) mentalities in 
Singapore. Urban Studies 54(13): 3101–3118. 
 
Hollands RG (2015) Critical interventions into the corporate smart city. Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 8(1): 61–77. 
 
Jessop B (2013) Hollowing out the ‘nation-state’and multi-level governance. In: Kennett 
P (ed) A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy, Second Edition. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, pp, 11-26 
 
Kitchin R (2014) The real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism. GeoJournal 79(1): 1–
14. 
 
Kitchin R (2015) Making sense of smart cities: addressing present shortcomings. 
Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 8(1): 131–136. 
 
Kitchin R, Cardullo P and Di Feliciantonio C (2019) Citizenship, Justice, and the Right 
to the Smart City. In Cardullo, et al. (eds) The Right to the Smart City. Emerald Publishing 
Limited, pp. 1–24. 
 
Kitchin R and Dodge M (2014) Code/space: Software and everyday life. Cambridge, 
Mass: Mit Press. 
 
 25 
Klauser F, Paasche T, and Söderström O (2014) Michel Foucault and the smart city: 
power dynamics inherent in contemporary governing through code. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 32(5): 869–885. 
 
Krivý M (2018) Towards a critique of cybernetic urbanism: The smart city and the society 
of control. Planning Theory 17(1): 8–30. 
 
De Lange M and De Waal M (2017) Owning the city: New media and citizen engagement 
in urban design. In Urban Land Use. Apple Academic Press, pp. 109–130. 
 
Lee JY, Woods O, and Kong L (2020) Towards more inclusive smart cities: Reconciling 
the divergent realities of data and discourse at the margins. Geography Compass 14(9): 
e12504. 
 
Lemke T (2015) Foucault, governmentality, and critique. Routledge. 
 
Leszczynski A (2016) Speculative futures: Cities, data, and governance beyond smart 
urbanism. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 48(9): 1691–1708. 
 
Li B, Chen C, and Hu B (2016) Governing urbanization and the new urbanization plan in 
China. Environment and Urbanization 28(2): 515–534. 
 
Li C, Liu X, Dai Z, et al. (2019) Smart city: A shareable framework and its applications 
in China. Sustainability 11(16): 4346. 
 
Li H and De Jong M (2017) Citizen participation in China’s eco-city development. Will 
“new-type urbanization” generate a breakthrough in realizing it?’ Journal of Cleaner 
Production 162: 1085–1094. 
 
Li L and Chan RCK (2017) Contesting China’s engagement with neoliberal urbanism. 
Asian Education and Development Studies 6(1): 44-56 
 
 26 
Liang F, Das V, Kostyuk N, et al. (2018) Constructing a Data‐Driven Society: China’s 
Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure. Policy & Internet 10(4): 415–
453. 
 
Lin Y (2018) A comparison of selected Western and Chinese smart governance: The 
application of ICT in governmental management, participation and collaboration, 
Telecommunications policy 42(10): 800–809. 
 
Liu X, Song Y, Wu K, et al. (2015) Understanding urban China with open data. Cities 47: 
53–61. 
 
Luque-Ayala A and Marvin S (2019) Developing a critical understanding of smart 
urbanism. In: Schwanen T and van Kempen R (eds) Handbook of Urban Geography. 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Mann M, Mitchell P, Foth M, et al. (2020) #BlockSidewalk to Barcelona: Technological 
sovereignty and the social license to operate smart cities. Journal of the Association for 
Information Science and Technology 71(9): 1103-1115. 
 
Ming Z and Wang Q (2013) Big Data Technology Enables Smart City Scientific 
Governance. Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanities and Social Sciences) 30(4): 
36–37. 
 
Morozov E (2013) To save everything, click here: technology, solutionism, and the urge 
to fix problems that don’t exist. London: Allen Lane. 
 
O’Malley P, Weir L, and Shearing C (1997) Governmentality, criticism, politics. 
Economy and society 26(4): 501–517. 
 
Odendaal N (2015) Getting smart about smart cities in Cape Town: Beyond the rhetoric. 
In Luque A, et al. (eds) Smart urbanism. Routledge, pp. 71–87. 
 
 27 
Peck J (2013) Explaining (with) neoliberalism. Territory, politics, governance 1(2): 132–
157. 
 
Perng SY, Kitchin R, and Mac Donncha D (2018) Hackathons, entrepreneurial life and 
the making of smart cities. Geoforum 97: 189–197. 
 
Pierce M (2017) Reading Response: “The Anxieties of Big Data” by Kate Crawford, 
Communication & New Media. Available at: https://medium.com/communication-new-
media/reading-response-the-anxieties-of-big-data-by-kate-crawford-7fb3da330ea9. 
 
Prasad D, Alizadeh T, and Dowling R (2021) Multiscalar Smart City Governance in India. 
Geoforum 121: 173–180. 
 
Shelton T and Lodato T (2019) Actually existing smart citizens: Expertise and (non) 
participation in the making of the smart city. City 23(1): 35–52. 
 
Shin HB (2014) Contesting speculative urbanisation and strategising discontents. City 
18(4–5): 509–516. 
 
So AY and Chu Y (2012) The transition from neoliberalism to state neoliberalism in 
China at the turn of the twenty-first century. In: Kyung-Sup C, et al. (eds) Developmental 
politics in transition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 166–187. 
 
Söderström O, Paasche T, and Klauser F (2014) Smart cities as corporate storytelling, 
City 18(3): 307–320. 
 
State Council (2014) Guo Jia Xin Xing Cheng Zhen Hua Gui Hua (2014-2020). 
 
Swilling M (2014) Contesting inclusive urbanism in a divided city: The limits to the 
neoliberalisation of Cape Town’s energy system. Urban Studies 51(15): 3180–3197. 
 
Thomas P (2016) Psycho politics, neoliberal governmentality and austerity. Self & 
 28 
Society 44(4): 382–393. 
 
Townsend AM (2013) Smart cities: Big data, civic hackers, and the quest for a new 
utopia. WW Norton & Company. 
 
Vanolo A (2014) Smartmentality: The smart city as disciplinary strategy. Urban studies 
51(5): 883–898. 
 
Witt MA and Redding G (2014) Authoritarian Capitalism. In: The Oxford handbook of 
Asian business systems. OUP Oxford, pp. 2. 
 
Xing L and Shaw TM (2013) The political economy of Chinese state capitalism. Journal 
of China and international relations 1(1): 26 
 
Xinhua (2019) Hebei to hold intl digital economy expo. Shijiazhuang Municipal People’s 
Government. Available at: 
http://www.sjz.gov.cn/col/1546231082146/2019/07/19/1563497587054.html 
 
Young GW, Kitchin R, and Naji J (2020) Building City Dashboards for Different Types 
of Users. Journal of Urban Technology 28(1): 1–21. 
 
Zhang A (2021) Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges 
Global Regulation. Oxford University Press. 
 
Zhang JC and Chen YC (2015) Enhancing open government information performance: a 
study of institutional capacity and organizational arrangement in China. Chinese Journal 
of Communication 8(2): 160–176. 
 
Zhang L (2012) Economic migration and urban citizenship in China: The role of points 
systems. Population and Development Review 38(3): 503–533. 
 
Zhang X (2008) Ziyou (Freedom) 1, Occupational Choice, and Labor: Bangbang in 
 29 
Chongqing, People’s Republic of China 2. International Labor and Working-Class 
History 73(1): 65–84. 
 
Zhao N (2011) 基于绿色交通理念的石家庄交通体系研究  [A study of the 
Shijiazhuang Transportation System on the basis of green transportation]. Baoding: Hebei 
Agricultural University. 
 
Zheng P and Scase R (2013) Emerging business ventures under market socialism: 
entrepreneurship in China. Routledge. 
 
 
 
